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There is concern from a human development perspective that demands to
reduce global greenhouse gasHG) emissions will unjustly deprive developing
countries of the same opportunities for industrialization already afforded to the
developed world. Humanitarians argue that such a limitation could inequitably
deny the developing world from achieving the economic development needed
to free its populations from extreme poverty. Yet choices to eradicate extreme
poverty or solve the global climate change problem need not be mutually
exclusive.
Central to both pursuits is the access to, and use of, energy in all of its
forms. The links between human development and access to energy are well-
documented.1 Equally documented are the links between fossil fuel consump-
tion and the emission of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere.
2 One way
to pursue both objectives is through global policies that encourage the devel-
opment of sustainable energy in the developing world. This is particularly
important on the African continent where access to energy is limited and
extreme poverty is widespread.3 In compelling the human race to embrace
such an approach, an opportunity has emerged in the twenty-first century to
both eradicate extreme poverty and stabilize the planet that we collectively
inhabit.
There are internationally agreed upon targets for extreme poverty reduc-
tions and GHG emission reductions: the Millennium Development Goals
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(MDGs)4 and the Kyoto Protocol5 respectively. Implicit in the achievement of
the MDGs targets is a drastic reduction in energy poverty in the poorest parts
of the world.6 On the other hand, the achievement of the targets set by the
Kyoto Protocol requires a global reduction in GHG emissions – the unwanted
by-product of fossil fuel based energy production. While the industrialized
world focuses on reducing energy consumption, the developing world is
focusing on increasing energy production. Despite these policy agendas aimed
at both curbing extreme poverty and GHG emissions, the industrialized coun-
tries of the world continue to burn fossil fuels at unsustainable rates while 1.6
billion people still have no access to electricity – including 85 percent of the
rural population on the African continent.7
To exacerbate such inequity, the effects of global climate change – primar-
ily caused by the industrialized world – will be borne disproportionately by the
poorest populations in the world. While the industrialized world should
arguably bear most of the cost for mitigating global GHG emissions, acknowl-
edgement that they also bear the duty to financially and technically assist the
poorest countries in their efforts to adapt to the future impacts of climate
change has been slow to come. However, recent progress in this regard has
been substantial.8 The announcement of the development of a robust 100
billion dollar a year Green Climate Fund indicates that the post-Kyoto era
appears to be aimed at remedying some of these key energy poverty issues.9
Overall though, the seemingly obvious links between climate change,
energy use, and extreme poverty are not explicitly integrated into either the
MDGs or the Kyoto Protocol. Implicitly however, the past ten years has seen
the development of a potentially transformative approach for addressing both
energy poverty and climate change. Dubbed the ‘Kyoto surprise,’ the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) appeared late in the negotiations of the
Kyoto Protocol as a market-based innovation linking sustainable development
with the task of reducing GHG emissions through an endorsement of carbon
emission trading between developed and developing countries (Yamin, 1998,
p. 115).
Coupled with the Joint Implementation mechanism (JI), the Kyoto Protocol
embraces these so-called flexible mechanisms as a way for industrialized
countries to meet their GHG emission reduction targets by investing in GHG
emission reducing projects in developing and transitional economies (Wright,
2007). However, the development process of the CDM has been guided by a
‘learn-by-doing’ approach and as such has experienced a number of significant
initial growing pains.10 And while the CDM has arguably only provided
marginal sustainable energy development benefits during the first compliance
period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008 through 2012), the post-Kyoto framework
should continue to embrace the CDM; albeit with a continued focus on
reforming the CDM towards the provision of specific sustainable development
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benefits to the poorest countries of the world – particularly the least developed
countries (LDCs) on the African continent (Subbarao and Lloyd, 2011).
This chapter aims to identify the limiting factors of the current CDM and
to advocate for a mechanism in the post-Kyoto era that will provide LDCs
with improved opportunities for pursuing sustainable energy development
strategies. Section 13.2 will outline the structures and function of the CDM as
implemented during the first compliance period. Sections 13.3, 13.4, and 13.5
will identify and analyze the operational and institutional deficiencies that
have emerged in the implementation of the CDM. Section 13.6 will propose a
reform agenda for the CDM in the post-Kyoto era; a modified framework and
set of rules better designed to facilitate sustainable energy development in
African and other slow developing countries.
13.2 GOALS AND STRUCTURE OF THE CDM
There is a broadening scientific consensus that the anthropomorphic activity
over the preceding two centuries, primarily from the uninhibited use of inex-
pensive fossil fuels, has led to greatly increased GHG concentrations in the
earth’s atmosphere.11 Projections hold that these increased concentrations of
industrial gases in the atmosphere will warm the earth’s surface temperature,
and in turn, lead to a rise in sea levels, changes in crop patterns, and increas-
ingly extreme weather conditions.12 The most significant global response to
climate change is manifest in the Kyoto Protocol: a binding commitment by
the industrialized nations of the world (except the United States (US)) to
reduce GHG emissions to approximately 5 per cent below 1990 levels
(Gerrard, 2007, p. 38). To achieve such targets, the Kyoto Protocol embraces
a market-based cap-and-trade approach to GHG emission reductions.
Under such a cap-and-trade system, industrialized nations with Kyoto
Protocol commitments (Annex B countries) can use a variety of means in
which to meet their target reductions in the first compliance period (Gerrard,
2007, pp. 42–50). The Kyoto Protocol includes a number of flexible mecha-
nisms aimed at reducing the cost of compliance for Annex I countries (indus-
trialized countries that are party to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC)).13 One such mechanism, the CDM, allows
developed countries to invest in GHG emission reduction projects in develop-
ing countries. The investing country can then use the resulting earned emission
credits to meet its own GHG emission reduction commitments.14 The CDM’s
innovation, however, comes not in its endorsement of a carbon trading system,
but rather in its requirement to bring sustainable development benefits to
developing countries. The investors in such projects, either a government
agency or private corporation, earn Certified Emission Reductions (CER): a
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form of carbon credit that an investor can either sell or use to meet a portion
of its own emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.15
The objectives of the CDM under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol are two-
fold. First, the CDM seeks to provide a market-based mechanism through
which governments and private sector entities in developed countries can
invest in projects that will enable them to reduce global GHG emissions at a
lower cost per ton of CO2 emitted.
16 Second, the CDM is a device to assist
developing countries in achieving their sustainable development objectives
(Wara, 2008, p. 1765).
The CDM emerged late in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations as a compro-
mise designed to promote cooperation between developing and developed
countries. The Brazilian delegation had proposed the establishment of a fund
under the Kyoto Protocol that would compel developed countries to finance
adaptation projects in developing countries (Yamin, 1998, p. 115). While the
proposed fund did not succeed, the resulting CDM incorporated design
elements to achieve a similar objective.17 Promoted under the Kyoto Protocol
as a means to meeting the overall objectives of the UNFCCC, the CDM
provides the potential for win-win opportunities: developed countries can
stabilize their GHG emissions, while at the same time encouraging sustainable
development in developing countries (Wara, 2008, pp. 1765–1766).
Developed countries benefit from the CDM in two ways. First, they can use
the mechanism as an alternative mode of compliance when they are unable to
meet commitment targets by regulating their domestic industries. Second, they
are able to reduce the compliance costs of meeting their domestic obligations
because GHG emission reductions are often achievable at a much lower
marginal cost in developing countries (Wara, 2008, p. 1765–1766). There are
two key limitations, however. One is that CDM projects must adhere to a
supplementarity principle: all CDM projects must be supplemental to domes-
tic efforts to meet Kyoto Protocol commitments.18 CDM projects are likewise
limited in that they cannot receive financing through a diversion of Official
Development Assistance (ODA) funds already targeted for other programs.
Essentially envisioned as a market-based program, primary funding of CDM
projects should originate in the private sector.
For the developing world, the CDM was envisioned as a tool for promot-
ing investment and technology transfer opportunities, while at the same time,
enabling Non-Annex I countries (non-industrialized countries that are party to
the UNFCCC) to achieve some of their sustainable development objectives.19
By encouraging sustainable development, the CDM could theoretically
provide Non-Annex I parties with financial incentives for low carbon intensity
development in the hope of nudging them onto more climate friendly trajec-
tory. In hosting CDM projects, developing countries could potentially attract
much needed foreign direct investment (FDI) in energy and infrastructure
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development, reap associated local air quality and health benefits, gain access
to low-cost or no-cost technology transfers, promote institutional capacity
building, improve land use, support rural development, and help promote
sustainable energy development.20
Operationally however, the flexible mechanisms permitted under the Kyoto
Protocol were little more than an empty shell after the landmark UNFCCC
Conference of the Parties (COP) in Kyoto, Japan in 1997 (Lecocq and
Ambrosi, 2007, p. 136). It was not until 2001 at the UNFCCC COP in Bonn,
Germany that negotiation of the actual framework for international emissions
trading under the CDM and the JI took place. The following year, at the COP
in Marrakesh, Morocco, the parties agreed to a rulebook for the operational
modes and modalities that would regulate the project cycle under the CDM
and JI.21 While the rulebook provided much needed guidance in the imple-
mentation of the flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, its specific
requirements have arguably hindered the effectiveness of the CDM in achiev-
ing some of its goals (Timilsina, 2009).22
As per the Marrakesh Accords, the CDM is a project-based system that
accomplishes its objectives through an individually approved and validated
project cycle. Each project’s proposal starts with a Project Design Document
(PDD), which includes inter alia, a description of the project, the baseline and
monitoring methodologies,23 and the environmental impacts of the project
(Lecocq and Ambrosi, 2007, pp. 137–138). The PDD must explain in detail
how future emission reductions from the project will be voluntary,24 real,25
additional,26 and not induce leakage.27 All four of these concepts require defi-
nition of a hypothetical baseline of emissions. This baseline represents the
timeline of emissions that would have occurred absent the subsidy provided by
the CDM project.28
Once finalized, both the host government (the Non-Annex I country) and
the sponsoring government (the Annex I country) must approve the PDD. In
order to participate in CDM projects, each developing country must establish
a Designated National Authority (DNA) that is responsible for approving
projects and verifying that the projects contribute to sustainable develop-
ment.29 If approved, the DNA of both the developing country and the devel-
oped country must issue a Letter of Approval (LoA) stating that participation
in the CDM is voluntary and will contribute to the host country’s sustainable
development objectives. The PDD and the LoA must then be validated by an
independent third party (typically an auditing company), the Designated
Operational Entity (DOE) (Lecocq and Ambrosi, 2007, pp. 137–138). By vali-
dating the project, the DOE determines that all parties approve the project, and
that it correctly applies the selected baseline and monitoring methodologies.30
The PDD and LoAs then go to the CDM Executive Board (CDM EB), who
registers the project and monitors its progress (Lecocq and Ambrosi, 2007, pp.
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137–138). After becoming operational, the CDM EB is responsible for issuing
the earned CER credits, and depositing them into the account of the project
participant. CER credits are equal to the GHG emission reduction of one ton
of CO2 equivalent, and are a fungible commodity tradable interchangeably
with other Kyoto Protocol allowances (CER credits, Emission Reduction
Units (ERUs), and Assigned Allocation Units (AAUs)).
13.3 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE CDM
A measurement of the exact sustainable development indicators as they relate
to CDM projects remains a challenge. However, the initial operation of the
CDM as implemented under the Kyoto Protocol, the Bonn framework, and the
Marrakesh rules has not resulted in the significant development of sustainable
energy projects on the African continent or other slow developing countries
(Fenhann and Staun, 2010; de Lopez, 2009; Timilsina, 2010).  Though the
CDM has proven successful as a means for reducing global GHG emissions at
a lower cost than would be possible for developed countries domestically, the
CDM has not effectively promoted energy development aimed at reducing
extreme poverty.31 Fortunately, the CDM EB is acutely aware of this criticism;
and is currently working on remedying many inadequacies as they relate to the
limited popularity of sustainable energy projects in LDCs.32 One key initiative
currently being developed is to provide special loans and assistance to LDCs
that have registered fewer than ten projects.33
As of 15 May 2011, the CDM EB has registered 3100 projects with more
than 6200 projects in the pipeline.34 Of the projects currently registered glob-
ally, the majority of CDM projects are concentrated in Latin America and Asia
with only 61 registered projects on the African continent.35 Further, of the
projected CER credits that will be issued worldwide from CDM projects
through the end of the first commitment period, only 25 per cent will come
from renewable energy projects.36
On the other hand, 25 per cent of expected CER credits after the first
commitment period will come from projects aimed at the capture and destruc-
tion of industrial gases that are the unwanted by-product of nylon-22 and
Teflon® production.37 These so-called hydrofluorocarbon-23 (HFC-23) and
nitrous oxide (N2O) abatement projects have produced a large number of CER
credits in India and China.38 Unfortunately, these projects have severely
undermined the credibility of the CDM process by creating false credits at
inflated costs with no sustainable development benefits (Wara, 2008, pp.
1768–1770). It can be noted, however, that the inadequacies related to CDM
abatement projects have largely been resolved and will not feature promi-
nently in the future development of the CDM.39 As recently as 2008, it was
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predicted that abatement projects would account for over 50 per cent of all the
expected CER credits to be issued during the first commitment period (Wara,
2008, pp. 1768–1770). The fact that this number is currently down to 25 per
cent indicates great progress in the promotion on non-abatement type projects
throughout the world.
It was initially predicted that the operation of the CDM would result in a
significant percentage of projects that have substantial sustainable develop-
ment benefits: renewable energy, fuel switching, waste heat capture, and
demand-side energy efficiency. However, CER credits issued to date have
come from a less than optimal percentage of sustainable energy projects.40
However, this too is changing. Recent increases in demand-side efficiency
projects, wind energy projects, and biomass energy production indicate
concerted efforts by the CDM to remedy many of the initial barriers to entry
that these types of projects faced.41 However, it remains the case that CDM
projects remain disproportionately absent from the African continent
(Timilsina, 2010; Byigero, 2010). The reason for the CDM’s limited influence
in Africa is likely the result of both CDM operational deficiencies and institu-
tional governance deficiencies among LDCs in Africa. In order to make the
CDM work as a tool for promoting sustainable energy development with
poverty reduction benefits on the African continent, both deficiencies need
correction.
13.4 OPERATIONAL BARRIERS
Turning first to the operational deficiencies of the CDM itself, both procedural
substantive barriers currently limit the effectiveness in bringing the CDM to
the poorest regions of the world. These operational deficiencies are broadly
classifiable into two categories: (1) inadequacies of the market-based
approach and (2) inadequacies of specific substantive and procedural require-
ments. The first category includes the low-hanging fruit problem, the inade-
quate definition of sustainable development under the CDM, and the problems
associated with using market mechanisms in environmental management. The
second category includes problems relating to the additionality and baseline
requirements, limitations on land use, forestry, and carbon sink projects, the
registration of small-scale projects, the cumbersome and costly requirements
of CDM project registration, and the uncertainty of the post-Kyoto framework
for CDM-type projects.
While the market-based approach to addressing global climate change
appears to have permanently seeped into the consciousness of the world’s
policy makers, it likewise has begun to appear that the same market-based
approach has the potential to broaden development inequities between the
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global North and the global South (Nygard, 2009, p. 36). Instead of promot-
ing projects that result in the greatest benefit to the greatest number of people,
the CDM has rewarded green entrepreneurs who have manipulated the CDM
in order to reap massive windfall profits from industrial gas abatement
projects that have provided few, if any, sustainable development benefits.42
CDM projects with the greatest sustainable benefits are often costly, and the
use – or misuse – of the CDM to procure CER credits at the lowest possible
cost (the low-hanging fruit issue) has prevented the promotion of costlier or
riskier sustainable projects in Africa.43 The low-hanging fruit issue states that
developed country entities or foreign investors will first sponsor projects that
are the most profitable, thus leaving the developing countries with only more
expensive measures when they have to meet their own emission reduction
commitments in the future.44 However, it appears that CDM projects have
now picked almost all the lowest-hanging fruit and there is a decided increase
in projects with more limited profit margins.45
Another operational barrier to the promotion of CDM projects is the vague-
ness of the sustainable development requirement. Currently, any project that is
found to reduce GHG emissions meets the sustainable development require-
ment. While the definition of sustainable development is malleable, it
certainly requires more than climate change mitigation practices.46 By requir-
ing a stricter definition of the sustainable development requirement, the CDM
could mitigate some of the market-based issues addressed above.
Under the current market-based regime, CDM projects with substantial
sustainable development benefits will appear prohibitively costly when forced
to compete with projects that provide windfall profits at low or no-cost to the
investor (such as industrial gas abatement projects) (Wara, 2008, p. 1765).
Using a cost-minimizing marketable rights approach to sustainable energy
development – when no factor other than CO2 emission reductions are taken
into account – leads to distortion of the projects selected (such as low-hanging
fruit projects), which may be far from the best projects to undertake in terms
of sustainable development more broadly conceived.
The second category of deficiencies is describable as follows: in order to
assure that CDM projects actually result in emission reduction benefits, the
CDM implementing rules contain both substantive and procedural require-
ments that have interfered with creating more CDM projects. One such issue
is the additionality requirement, which – as currently defined under the CDM
– limits the possibility of projects on the African continent. Reductions in
emissions must be in addition to any that would occur in the absence of the
CDM project (the business-as-usual scenario) (Nelson, 2004, p. 636). Using
this baseline approach rewards investors for cleaning up older fossil fuel based
energy systems, but almost completely excludes projects that avoid future
emissions through new renewable energy projects. Furthermore, this approach
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has limited the types of land use projects permitted under the CDM; only
projects for reforestation and afforestation47 are authorized under the current
modalities (Ellis and Kamel, 2007, p. 36).48
For Africa, the inclusion of projects that avoid deforestation could have a
significant impact in both preserving forests and promoting projects that
reduce the use of unsustainable biomass fuelwood through fuel switching
projects (Laurance, 2007, pp. 20–24). Hence, an additionality requirement that
is determined in terms of GHG emissions avoided instead of GHG emissions
reduced could be possible. Under such an avoidance approach, investors
would be rewarded for promoting projects that entirely bypass fossil fuel
based energy development (so-called leap-frogging) (Laurance, 2007, pp.
20–24). However, such an avoidance approach represents a fundamental real-
ity – if we give developed countries credit for assisting avoiding future emis-
sions in developing countries and give them permission to continue to emit
based on those credits, we have not reduced emissions at all. Therefore, a
better solution may be to include a separate mechanism in the post-Kyoto
agreement that rewards investors and states who avoid increasing emissions
through poor land use choices, deforestation, and fossil fuel based energy
development. Such a mechanism would encompass both the North and the
South, but place substantial responsibility on the North to finance the incen-
tives used to encourage nations in the South to make better land use decisions,
avoid deforestation, and leap-frog over fossil fuel technologies.
The required costs and cumbersome processes of CDM registration further
hinder CDM projects. The current CDM process encourages large-scale
projects that can quickly reap CER credits at the lowest possible cost. Small-
scale renewable energy projects or small-scale carbon sink projects do not fare
well under the current CDM process (Fenhann and Staun, 2010). While there
have been attempts to increase awareness of CDM opportunities in Africa
through such initiatives as the Nairobi framework49 and the Africa Carbon
Forum,50 the CDM process remains a challenge for countries on the African
continent (Timilsina, 2010). For small-scale projects, the cost and time
required to register a CDM project is often prohibitive (Sum Low, 2006, pp.
76–80).
The CDM process requires vast documentation, technical and scientific
expertise, costs ranging from 30 to 250 thousand dollars, and times ranging
from nine months to a year.51 There have been some recent attempts to remedy
this problem by allowing the bundling of small-scale projects and allowing for
programmatic CDM projects (called Program of Activity (PoA)
projects).52Under the bundling approach, registration of multiple small-scale
projects – such as decentralized renewable energy projects in rural areas – are
combinable, thus making the CDM registration process more feasible.53
Likewise, PoA projects allow developing countries to earn CER credits for
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programs (as opposed to individual projects) for reducing GHG emissions.54
These programmatic and bundling ideas have the potential to improve the
administration of the CDM dramatically (Subbarao and Lloyd, 2011).
Finally, while the current operational guidelines of the CDM do permit the
issuance of CER credits beyond the Kyoto Protocol’s first compliance period,
such credits could become valueless without future commitment periods that
embrace a CDM-type program (Ellis and Kamel, 2007, pp. 40–41). While the
2007 Bali COP decided on a road map for post-Kyoto negotiations,55 the 2009
Copenhagen COP56 and the 2010 Cancun COP57 have failed to produce bind-
ing commitments for a second commitment period. As such, many projects
that have long life spans – carbon sink projects and large-scale renewable
energy projects – will not earn CER credits until after the first commitment
period has concluded (Ellis and Kamel, 2007, pp. 40–41). However, the inclu-
sion of a CDM-type program is likely in any future agreement, and therefore
difficulties associated with post-Kyoto credits should disappear as soon as a
long-term global agreement is adopted.58
Despite the fact that a binding second commitment period has not emerged,
the continued reform, modification, and improvement of the major problems
identified in the current CDM program is ongoing and promises to result in a
more equitable distribution of projects, especially on the African continent.
Therefore, while the current CDM has not been effective as a means for
promoting sustainable energy development and poverty reduction on the
African continent, the CDM concept remains visionary, and if properly
reformed, promises to be a powerful development tool in the post-Kyoto era.
13.5 INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS
Beyond the operational deficiencies of the CDM, other institutional issues
play a significant role in limiting the proliferation of CDM projects in Africa.
Many of the problems plaguing development in Africa are not specific to the
CDM, but rather are institutional challenges for all development sectors
(Winkelman and Moore, 2011, p. 1132). Economic development on the
African continent has been a vexing issue for decades. Weak and corrupt insti-
tutions, high population growth, declining external resource flows, growing
external debt, inadequate social development, lack of infrastructure and envi-
ronmental constraints, high rates of poverty, low standard of living and disease
pandemics present countries in Africa with some of the most daunting chal-
lenges of any region on earth (Nelson, 2004, pp. 616–618).
Many of these problems have the potential to deteriorate further in the
coming decades as Africa begins to feel the impact of global climate change:
water and food shortages, mass migration, the creation of climate change
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refugees, resource wars, draught, flooding, desertification, and sea level rise
(Nelson, 2004, pp. 616–618). Despite the African continent’s minimal contri-
bution to the global warming problem, scientists expect the effects of global
climate change to affect Africa disproportionately (Sum Low, 2006, pp.
76–80). Current projections indicate that developing countries face 75 to 80
per cent of the potential damage from climate change.59
From an institutional perspective, the barriers to the successful implemen-
tation of CDM projects on the African continent are dividable into two cate-
gories: (1) climate change-related problems and (2) economic development-
related problems. In terms of economic development challenges, Africa is
plagued with a high-risk environment (weak rule of law traditions, high levels
of graft and corruption, and poor governance standards) that limits the amount
of FDI flowing onto the continent (Nelson, 2004, p. 634). Since the funding of
CDM projects comes primarily from private investment, such a limitation is
important.
A further economic-related barrier stems from the mismatch between the
climate-focused priorities of the CDM and the economic development-focused
priorities of LDCs on the African continent. Climate change-related challenges
include the lack of capacity and technical knowledge needed to adapt to climate
change, the problems created by the limited involvement of Non-Annex I coun-
tries in the UNFCCC decision-making process, and the disconnect between
GHG reduction priorities of the developed world and the energy development
priorities of countries in Africa.60 The African continent, despite its abundance
of natural resources, accounts for only 2.5 per cent of the world’s economic
activity (Nelson, 2004, p. 634). Some non-governmental organizations hold
that it is Africa’s very low levels of energy consumption (2–3 per cent of the
world’s energy consumption) that are both the cause and consequence of under-
development (Nelson, 2004, pp. 634–635). Bringing energy to African popula-
tions, sustainable or not, is an exceedingly difficult problem.
The African continent continues to have the lowest rate of FDI globally: an
acknowledged necessity for financing energy projects in the poorest regions of
the world (Udombana, 2002, p. 304). While global strategies to increase FDI
and improve governance in less developed countries is beyond the scope of
this chapter, there are modifications to the CDM that might be able to increase
FDI flows in developing countries: investment incentives and protection
mechanisms, vehicles for technology transfer, and information dissemination
about emerging carbon trading markets.61
Another barrier to the promotion of CDM projects on the African Continent
stems from a mismatch between the priorities of the CDM and the develop-
ment priorities of countries in Africa. The CDM focuses on GHG emission
reductions through two major categories of projects: (1) GHG capture of
industrial and agricultural gases, and (2) the promotion of clean technologies
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that either clean up or replace dirtier fossil fuel based energy production
systems (Ellis and Kamel, 2007, pp. 11–12). With few such opportunities in
Africa, the majority of eligible CDM projects do not address the African conti-
nent’s need for projects that both increase access to energy and adapt to future
climate change problems (Byigero, 2010). Further, the primary development
agenda for countries in Africa remains food, water, and energy security – as
the majority population on the continent is still living in poverty (Nelson,
2004, p. 625).
While the MDGs do not deal specifically with energy development and
climate change, the achievement of the MDGs in Africa will require both
climate change adaption and increased access to sustainable energy (Subbarao
and Lloyd, 2011, p. 1600). To date, Africa has experienced little industrial
development compared to the rest of the world. As there is a perceived histor-
ical relation between fossil fuel consumption and prosperity, the African conti-
nent is still awaiting its industrial revolution. From the African perspective,
access to energy, sustainable or not, is high on the development agenda
(Nelson, 2004, p. 625). Without strong incentives to develop along a sustain-
able energy path, Africa’s future industrialization could follow the same
unsustainable fossil fuel model that is now challenging the developed world.
The CDM, primarily a GHG reduction mechanism, is ill equipped to incen-
tivize the development of a sustainable energy system for an entire continent.
Further, as environmental restrictions become more limiting in the developed
world, an increase in the dumping of polluting technologies in Africa is likely
to produce leakage. Therefore, policies to disincentivise the promotion of
fossil fuel based energy systems on the African continent are important and
can benefit both the developing and developed world in long-term global
efforts to adapt to climate change.
Another institutional barrier preventing the utilization of the CDM on the
African continent is the limited role that Non-Annex I countries play in the
development of the global climate change regime. The UNFCCC continues to
promote a posture of common, but differentiated responsibilities for members
of the convention.62 While such an approach is crucial in setting GHG emis-
sion reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, it has created consid-
erable difficulties in developing a comprehensive global regime to address
climate change.
Developed countries (primarily the US) have always criticized the Kyoto
Protocol’s refusal to set GHG emission reduction commitments for emerging
or transitional countries such as India and China (Gerrard, 2007, p. 21). While
the rejection of the Kyoto Protocol by the US is proving to be an unsophisti-
cated and detrimental approach, the LDCs appear to support the US point of
view; however, for completely different reasons. Under the current regime,
countries with no commitments play a limited role in the decision-making
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process (Nelson, 2004, p. 636). Likewise, Non-Annex I countries are restricted
in their participation in the market for trading carbon emission credits.
One possible approach to this problem is to allocate emission rights among
all states on a per-capita basis (Nelson, 2004, p. 636). The per-capita approach
reflects the view that all of the world’s population has an equitable right to
share equally in the use of the atmosphere. Under such an approach, developed
countries currently overusing their share of the atmosphere’s assimilative
capacity will gradually reduce emissions while the underdeveloped regions of
the world would increase their emissions until they reach a comparable state
of economic development (Nelson, 2004, p. 636).
A final institutional hurdle to the promotion of CDM projects on the
African continent is its extensive use of unsustainable biomass as a primary
energy source. The population on the African continent is as diverse and
complex as any region of the world; however, the majority of the population
is rural, agrarian, and pre-industrial. As mentioned, energy infrastructure is
almost nonexistent in rural areas on the continent. What infrastructure does
exist is crumbling and unreliable (Nelson, 2004, pp. 625–626). The primary
energy source for Africa’s rural population is biomass – such as fuelwood and
agricultural and animal residues (Bluemel, 2007, p. 675). While biomass
energy provides about 11 per cent of the global primary energy supply, the
share of biomass in primary energy consumption on the African continent is
around 70 per cent (Bluemel, 2007, p. 675). Since the CDM is primarily
concerned with reducing GHG emissions, it fails to address many of the land
use issues that would be required to disincentivise the destruction of forests for
fuelwood (Ellis and Kamel, 2007, pp. 11–12).
Considering that 70 per cent of the energy in Africa comes from unsustain-
able biomass consumption, any mechanism for promoting sustainable energy
development in African needs to include provisions for promoting alternatives
to such use (Lecocq and Ambrosi, 2007, pp. 147–148). One of the major prob-
lems of current patterns of unsustainable biomass use is its low conversion effi-
ciency. Domestic use of fuelwood has a conversion rate of about 10 per cent
(Bluemel, 2007, p. 675). Such inefficiency creates social development prob-
lems as children and women in rural areas on the African continent can spend
up to seven hours a day collecting fuel for cooking.63 Further, smoke from the
burning of biomass on open fires kills an estimated 2.5 million women and chil-
dren annually, with such prolonged smoke inhalation being a major factor in the
contraction of acute respiratory infection.64 Providing fuel switching to cleaner
and more efficient energy sources could transform rural Africa. Not only would
the development of simple renewable decentralized energy systems provide the
rural poor with a greatly enhanced standard of living, it would also reduce the
amount of fuelwood harvested from forests. However, under the current CDM,
sustainable biomass projects have been few in number.65
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13.6 OVERCOMING OPERATIONAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS
In order for the CDM to become an effective tool for promoting energy devel-
opment on the African continent, three post-Kyoto scenarios seem feasible.
The first scenario keeps the basic CDM framework in future commitment peri-
ods, while reforming the current regime’s shortcomings (Wara, 2008, p. 1765).
A second approach is to abandon the market-based approach and adopt a fund-
based approach best exemplified by the Montreal Protocol’s Multilateral
Fund.66 A fund-based approach has the potential to encounter problems simi-
lar to those currently challenging the CDM. However, it could increase the
efficiency of the flexible mechanisms, increase the ability to target projects
that create tangible sustainable development benefits, and increase the ability
for implementing projects that are necessary (such as renewable energy
projects on the African continent), but not economically feasible under a
market-based system.
Despite the potential advantages of a fund-based program, it has been
assumed that the post-Kyoto framework is likely to be market-based (Ellis and
Kamel, 2007, pp. 40–41). Yet, recent developments in a fund-based approach
have been significant.67 The World Bank Group’s Clean Technology Fund and
the Strategic Climate Fund,68 the proposed Green Climate fund currently
being developed by the UNFCCC COP,69 the UN Adaptation Fund,70 and the
various national climate funds that individual developed countries have estab-
lished constitute a serious trend away from purely market-based solutions to
climate change. Statements that the CDM will continue to function, coupled
with the recent proliferation of climate funds, indicates that a hybrid approach
is actually emerging. This third scenario appears more and more likely to
represent the path that the global community takes in its efforts to curb climate
change.
Regardless of what approach becomes dominant in the post-Kyoto era, the
continued reform of the CDM in the short-term remains important. From the
macro level, increasing FDI flows to Africa in the coming years is important
(Ellis and Kamel, 2007, pp. 16–17). In Africa, access to project financing
limits the potential of CDM projects specifically, and sustainable development
projects generally.71 The future of any CDM-type program Africa will require
increased levels of FDI, and developed countries can encourage these
increases through various investment incentives and guarantees. More specif-
ically, there are a number of CDM-based methods that could be pursued.
One approach could be to create a quota system that caps the number of
projects in individual countries (Nelson, 2004, p. 635). By limiting the number
of projects in faster developing countries (such as China, Brazil, and India),
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the CDM could compel investment in higher risk environments (such as
LDCs) (Schatz, 2008, pp. 708–709). A quota system would likely limit the
number of low-hanging fruit projects. This limitation on the number of low-
cost projects would have the potential to compel investment in more expen-
sive sustainable energy projects.
Another approach could be to include a mechanism allowing for a full
menu of emission reduction strategies in slower developing countries but
limit the strategies given to faster developing countries. Likewise, the CDM
could be modified in a manner that sets the value of CER credits on a slid-
ing scale: for example, a CDM project in a faster developing country might
receive 0.5 times emission reductions, while LDCs receive full credit. Along
these lines, the current CDM strategy to promote projects in LDCs includes
the aforementioned policy to provide incentives, assistance, and loans to
countries that have registered fewer than 10 projects.72
The future success of a CDM-type program on the African continent will
also require the allowance of GHG avoidance projects, not just GHG reduc-
tion projects. Such an outlook will allow a variety of projects that create
incentives to make better land use choices. This will require a new definition
of sustainable development under the CDM; a definition that would encom-
pass a full range of mitigation and adaptation projects that currently do not
fit neatly into the clean development box: reforestation and afforestation
projects, livestock projects, land use projects, hydropower projects, gas
capture, and industrial gas reduction projects. Further, in order to promote
long-term renewable energy projects and true carbon sink projects through
the CDM, the international community must agree to binding future commit-
ment periods in an effort to provide certainty in the long-term viability of a
global carbon market.
The CDM to date has had considerable success in providing low-cost
GHG reduction opportunities to developed world countries. However, crit-
ics of the CDM hold that even this aspect has been a failure. A 2007 study
found that a major class of CDM projects (HFC-23 abatement projects) paid
as much as 50 times more for its GHG emission reductions than the costs
alone would warrant, with the excessive profits ending up with the factories
and the carbon traders (Wara, 2007, p. 595). Such projects have severely
undermined the promotion of the CDM as a legitimate tool for achieving
sustainable development objectives. The success of any future CDM-type
program will require improvement to the substantive requirements of
sustainable development in order to mandate that the developed world help
pay for projects that promote climate change adaptation, but also provide
economic and social development benefits to local populations in the poor-
est regions of the world.
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13.7 CONCLUSION
As the global climate change regime ramps up in coming years, it is important
that efforts to promote sustainable energy development on the African conti-
nent likewise increase in scope. Arguably, we all bear a moral and financial
duty to prevent slow developing countries from the suffering caused by the
historically inequitable distribution of the world’s resources. If developed
properly, the CDM still has the potential to bring much needed capital and
technical expertise to Africa.73 By helping LDCs adapt to climate change, the
global community has the opportunity to reduce poverty and reduce GHG
emissions at the same time. Yet, there is certainly the possibility that, absent
specific reforms to the CDM, a market-based approach to climate change will
only continue to address the problems facing the African continent inade-
quately.
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